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THE RETURN OF THE SELF, OR WHATEVER
HAPPENED TO POSTMODERN
JURISPRUDENCE?
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN*
ABSTRACT

Postmodernjurisprudencewas all the rage in the 1990s. Two of
the most renownedpostmodernists, Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag,
both persistently criticized mainstream legal scholarsfor believing
they were modernist selves independent, sovereign, and
autonomous agents who could remake the social and legal world
merely by writing a law review article. Then Fish and Schlag turned
on each other. Each attacked the other for making the same
mistake: harboringa modernist self I revisit this skirmish for two
reasons. First, it helps explain the current moribund state of
postmodern jurisprudence. If two of the leading postmodernists
could not avoid embedding a self in their respective writings, then
what was the point of criticizing mainstream legal scholars for
doing the same? Second, an understanding of this conflict between
Fish and Schlag can help suggest a path forward for
postmodernism. Since 2000, when Fish publishedhis attack against
Schlag, feminist theorists have developed intertwined concepts of a
relational self and relational autonomy. These feminist concepts
provide a springboardfor launchingpostmodern jurisprudenceinto
new territory.

* Visiting Scholar, Harvard Law School. Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished
Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. I thank Stanley
Fish and Pierre Schlag for their comments on earlier drafts and Joshua Eames for his research
assistance.
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INTRODUCTION

Many years ago, Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag attacked each other's
scholarship. Ironically, these two leading postmodern jurisprudents
accused the other of making the same mistake.' Schlag went first,
denouncing Fish's scholarship as harboring a modernist self2
Subsequently, Fish turned around and similarly criticized Schlag's
scholarship.3

1. For a history of American jurisprudence, including a discussion of the postmodern era, see
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT FROM PREMODERNISM TO POSTMODERNISM: AN
INTELLECTUAL VOYAGE (2000) [hereinafter Feldman, VOYAGE].
2. Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37
(1987) [hereinafter Schlag, Fish v. Zapp]. Schlag's other writings include the following: PIERRE
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998); PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW:
MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING];
Pierre Schlag, Spam Jurisprudence,Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report
on the State ofthe Art), 97 GEO. L.J. 803 (2009) [hereinafter Schlag, Spam]; Pierre Schlag, Formalism
and Realism in Ruins (Mappingthe Logics of Collapse), 95 IOWA L. REV. 195 (2009); Pierre Schlag,
The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1047 (2002); Pierre Schlag, Law and
Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997) [hereinafter Schlag, Phrenology]; Pierre Schlag, Writing
For Judges, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 419 (1992) [hereinafter Schlag, Writing]; Pierre Schlag, The
Problem of the Subject, 69 TEx. L. REV. 1627 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag, The Problem]; Pierre
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1991) [hereinafter Schlag,
Normativity]; Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167 (1990) [hereinafter
Schlag, Nowhere]; Pierre Schlag, Missing Pieces: A Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REV.
1195 (1989) [hereinafter Schlag, Missing Pieces].
3. Stanley Fish, Theory Minimalism, 37 San Diego L. Rev. 761 (2000) [hereinafter Fish,
Minimalism]. Fish's other writings include the following: STANLEY FISH, THINK AGAIN (2015);
STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE WITH PRINCIPLE (1999) [hereinafter FISH, PRINCIPLE]; STANLEY FISH,
THERE'S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH AND IT'S A GOOD THING, TOO (1994); STANLEY FISH,
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I revisit this skirmish for two reasons. First, it helps explain the current
moribund state of postmodern jurisprudence. Second, it suggests a path
forward in revitalizing postmodern theory. Postmodernism cannot be
easily defined. As numerous commentators have observed, however, it can
most readily be characterized in opposition to modernism.4 If modernism
demands that knowledge be based on firm foundations, that language be
representational of the external world, and that society be constituted by
bounded atom-like individuals, then postmodernism is anti-foundational,
anti-representational,
and anti-individualist. 5 More affirmatively,
postmodernists tend to study the operation of power in society and its
institutions, particularly the way power works through language or
discourse.6
To understand modernism as a counterpoint to postmodernism,
consider the children's book, Haroldand the Purple Crayon. Harold is a
small boy with a round head, wispy strands of hair, and plain white
sleeper-pajamas. Wherever he goes, Harold carries a purple crayon, and
with that crayon, he literally makes his world. If Harold wants to stroll
down "a long straight path,"" he draws a line and walks along it. When
Harold falls into the sea, he draws a boat and sets sail. When Harold tires
of sailing, he draws land and steps ashore. In the end, when Harold grows

DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989) [hereinafter FISH, NATURALLY]; Stanley Fish, Dennis
Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Dennis Martinez];
Stanley Fish, Change, 86 SOUTH ATLANTIC Q. 423 (1987) [hereinafter Fish, Change]; Stanley Fish,
Consequences, 11 CRITICAL INQUIRY 433 (1985) [hereinafter Fish, Consequences]; Stanley Fish, Fish
v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984) [hereinafter Fish, Fiss]; Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain
Gang. Interpretation in the Law and in Literary Criticism, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201 (1982)
[hereinafter Fish, Chain Gang]; Stanley Fish, Interpretation and the PluralistVision, 60 TEX. L. REV.
495 (1982); STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 1 (1980) [hereinafter FISH, CLASS];
Stanley Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech Acts, the Ordinary, the
Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY
625 (1978).
4. NANCEY MURPHY, ANGLO-AMERICAN POSTMODERNITY 1 (1997); Dennis Patterson,
Introduction, in POSTMODERNISM AND LAW, at xi, xii-xiv (1994).
5. Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 254, 262-79 (1992);
Peter C. Schanck, Understanding Postmodern Thought and its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505, 2508-09 (1992).
6. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality 81-102 (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); Michel
Foucault, Discipline and Punish 26-31 (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977) [hereinafter Foucault, Discipline];
see Steven Best & Douglas Kellner, The Postmodern Turn 255-60 (1997) (identifying four
postmodern themes); Feldman, Voyage, supra note 1, at 37-45, 137-87 (characterizing
postmodemism in accord with eight overlapping themes).
7. CROCKETT JOHNSON, HAROLD AND THE PURPLE CRAYON (1955). This book is not paginated,
so I do not cite to specific page numbers.
8. Id.
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sleepy, he makes his bed. He climbs in and draws up the covers. Warm
and cozy, Harold drifts off to sleep.
Harold exemplifies the modernist self, a "legislator-in-chief." 9 He is an
independent and autonomous agent exercising sovereign control over
himself and his world. His enormous power to choose and act is not
dependent on or limited by social relationships.' ° He is completely selfreliant.
As postmodernists, neither Fish nor Schlag would like Harold. In fact,
they devoted much of their respective careers to criticizing traditional legal
scholars for believing that they and their readers were little Harolds.
Traditional legal scholars, Fish and Schlag argued, acted like modernist
selves, as if they could change the legal and social world as easily as
Harold could draw a picture. Traditional legal scholars wrote reams of
articles and books, sketching elaborate theories, articulating precise
principles, and recommending judicial outcomes. These scholars believed
their writings actually produced positive social and legal change, yet they
were mistaken, as Fish and Schlag repeatedly declared. To be sure, these
scholars generated more theories, principles, and recommendations, but
rather than changing the world for the better, these scholars and their
earnest writings merely reassured themselves that they and their readers
were modernist selves."
Given that Fish and Schlag agreed on so much, why did they ultimately
turn on each other? As I explain, one cannot write jurisprudential
scholarship without revealing a self, despite best efforts. Even so,
scholarship over the last fifteen years demonstrates that Fish and Schlag
too quickly attached certain assumptions to the concept of the self. Recent
scholarship has sketched a relational self that can exercise a degree of
autonomy without declaring its independent sovereignty. Indeed, in the
year 2000, when Fish published his attack on Schlag, feminist theorists
published an anthology articulating a concept of a relational self and
exploring its implications for autonomy. 12 This volume, entitled Relational
Autonomy, initiated an outburst of scholarly activity elaborating on the

9. See Zygmunt Bauman & Rein Raud, Practices of Selfhood 3 (2015).
10. Id. at 1-3; See also PHILIP CUSHMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE SELF, CONSTRUCTING AMERICA
30-33 (1995); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 143-98 (1989).

11. Fish's and Schlag's arguments will be elaborated in the text. See, e.g., Schlag, Nowhere,
supra note 2; Fish, DennisMartinez, supra note 3.
12. RELATIONAL AUTONOMY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON AUTOMONY, AGENCY, AND THE

SOCIAL SELF (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000). Of course, some feminist theorists
had previously discussed issues related to women's agency and autonomy. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex
Wars Redux: Agency and Coercionin Feminist Legal Theory, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 304 (1995).
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concepts of the relational self and relational autonomy.' 3 In this Article, I
draw on this recent feminist scholarship to explain how this relational self
can resuscitate postmodern jurisprudence more generally. 14
Part I of this Article sets forth the main critical positions of Fish and
Schlag. Part II examines how Fish and Schlag turned their respective
critical gazes on each other. Part III explains the concept of the relational
or postmodern self, and Part IV briefly explores some implications of this
reconceived self
I. FISH AND SCHLAG CRITICIZE TRADITIONAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP

A. Fish and InterpretivePractices
For at least four centuries, starting in the 1600s, modernist (western)
metaphysics sharply split an independent and autonomous self from an
external and objective world.'5 To have knowledge, the self somehow
needed to bridge the gap between itself and the objects of the external
world. 16 If the self could not bridge the gap either by directly accessing or
mirroring in consciousness the objective world, then the self would be
doomed to relativism, nihilism, and solipsism. Consequently, when it
came to hermeneutics-the understanding and interpretation of a text-the
self supposedly would need to directly access the objective meaning of the
text. The textual meaning, that is, was an object that could be known, but
only if one could apply a method or technique to overcome one's
preexisting prejudices that otherwise would obscure the true meaning of
the text. For instance, some constitutional theorists-now referred to as
old originalists-insisted that in order to understand the objective meaning
of a constitutional provision, a judge would need to ascertain the framers'

13. See Paul Benson, Feminist Commitments and Relational Autonomy, in AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 87, 87 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (emphasizing the

importance of the RelationalAutonomy volume). Some helpful books published subsequently include
the following (listed chronologically): MARILYN FRIEDMAN, AUTONOMY, GENDER, POLITICS (2003);
JENNIFER NEDELSKY, LAW'S RELATIONS: A RELATIONAL THEORY OF SELF, AUTONOMY AND LAW
(2011); THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING SUBJECTIVITIES AND

NEW FORMS OF RESISTANCE (Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease eds., 2014); AUTONOMY,
OPPRESSION, AND GENDER (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014); PERSONAL AUTONOMY AND
SOCIAL OPPRESSION: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES (Marina A.L. Oshana ed., 2015).
14. See Rosalind Dixon, Feminist Disagreement (Comparatively) Recast, 31 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 277, 278 (2008) (underscoring that recent feminist scholarship is often disregarded).
15. See Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 15-28 (discussing the development of modernist
metaphysics).
16. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
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intentions when they originally wrote that provision. 17 Any judge who
failed to follow this or some other ostensibly methodical or mechanical
process for ascertaining objective constitutional meaning would
necessarily become an unconstrained "rogue judge."' 8 From this modernist
perspective, interpretation presents us with an either/or: Either we access
objective textual meaning, or we freely impose on the text whatever
meaning we subjectively prefer.
Typical of postmodernists, Fish sought to dissolve the dilemma of this
either/or.' 9 According to Fish, neither "the independent or uninterpreted
text"-that is, objectivity-nor "the independent and freely interpreting
reader"-that is, free-floating subjectivity-is possible.20 Objectivity is
impossible, because we always are already interpreting. Neither the text,
the author's (such as the constitutional framers') intentions, nor anything
else is accessible as brute data or, in other words, as an uninterpreted
objective source of meaning. 2' Yet subjectivity also is impossible, because
the individual interpreter or reader is never unconstrained-never free
merely to impose her personally preferred meanings on the text. The
interpreter, Fish explained, always is constrained by the practices of her
"Interpretive

community,

2

which

impart

"assumed

distinctions,

17. Focusing on the original public meaning is referred to as 'new originalism,' while focusing
on framers' intentions is 'old originalism.' Stephen M. Feldman, ConstitutionalInterpretation and
History: New Originalism or Eclecticism?, 28 BYU J. PUB. L. 283, 284-86 (2014). For examples of
old originalism, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Robert H. Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). For illustrations of new
originalism, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 38 (1997); ROBERT BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA 6, 143 -44 (1990).

18. J.M. Balkin, Ideology as Constraint, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1141 (1991).
19. Fish argued that his interpretivist approach resolved "a question that had long seemed crucial
to literary studies. What is the source of interpretive authority: the text or the reader?" Fish, Change,
supra note 3, at 423; see Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 29-39 (explaining the postmodern
rejection of the modernist either/or of epistemological foundationalism).
20. Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 3, at 211-12.
21. "[T]here is no such thing as literal meaning, if by literal meaning one means a meaning that
is perspicuous no matter what the context and no matter what is in the speaker's or hearer's mind, a
meaning that because it is prior to interpretation can serve as a constraint on interpretation." FISH,
NATURALLY, supra note 3, at 4.
22. Fish wrote:
At this point it looks as if the text is about to be dislodged as a center of authority in favor of
the reader whose interpretive strategies make it; but I forestall this conclusion by arguing that
the strategies in question are not his in the sense that would make him an independent agent.
Rather, they proceed not from him but from the interpretive community of which he is a
member; they are, in effect, community property, and insofar as they at once enable and limit
the operations of his consciousness, he is too....
[I]t is interpretive communities, rather than
either the text or the reader, that produce meanings and are responsible for the emergence of
formal features. Interpretive communities are made up of those who share interpretive
strategies not for reading but for writing texts, for constituting their properties. In other words
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categories of understanding, and stipulations of relevance and
irrelevance., 23 Thus, for the same reason that objectivity is impossiblebecause we always are already interpreting-unconstrained subjectivity
likewise is impossible. No interpreter ever stands prior to or outside of
interpretive practices, which always and necessarily limit one's
interpretation of any text, including the Constitution. In short, the practices
of an interpretive community simultaneously enable and limit textual
understanding: An interpretive community organizes the world for its
members by relating phenomena "to the interests and goals that make the
community what it is." 24
Once we accept Fish's conceptualization of textual interpretation, then
the notion of specifying some method or mechanical process for
ascertaining objective meaning, such as discovering the framers'
intentions, becomes vacuous. 25 There is no pure objective meaning and no
free-floating subjective interpreter, so no method can possibly bridge an
ostensible gap between the two (because the gap does not exist). Fish
therefore criticized numerous jurisprudents, including Ronald Dworkin,
who sought to explain why and how legal interpretation and judicial
decision making are objective.2 6 A judge cannot follow the law by
mechanically ascertaining the meaning of a legal rule, as embodied in the
Constitution or some other legal text, and then applying that rule to the
instant case. To the contrary, Fish explained:
The very ability to formulate a [judicial] decision in terms that
would be recognizably legal depends on one's having internalized
the norms, categorical distinctions, and evidentiary criteria that
make up one's understanding of what the law is. That understanding
is developed in the course of an educational experience whose
materials are the unfolding succession of cases, holdings, dissents,

these strategies exist prior to the act of reading and therefore determine the shape of what is
read rather than, as is usually assumed, the other way around.
FISH, CLASS, supra note 3, at 13-14.

23. Fish, Change, supra note 3, at 423-24.
24. Id. at 433. "[T]here has never been nor ever will be anyone who could survey interpretive
possibilities from a vantage point that was not itself already interpretive." Fish, Dennis Martinez,
supra note 3, at 1795.
25.

Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 437.

26. Fish, Chain Gang, supra note 3 (criticizing Dworkin); see Ronald Dworkin, Law as
Interpretation,in The Politics of Interpretation 249 (William J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983) (explaining law

as interpretation). Owen Fiss had attempted to appropriate Fish's ideas on interpretation to help
explain the constraints imposed on judges. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L.
REv. 739 (1982) (relying on Stanley Fish to develop views on law and interpretation). Fish thought
that Fiss had seriously misunderstood his ideas. Fish, Fiss,supra note 2.
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legislative actions, etc., that are the stuff of law school instruction
and of the later instruction one receives in a clerkship or as a junior
associate .27
Fish furthered his criticism of legal scholarship by arguing that theory has
no consequences. He defined theory as "an abstract or algorithmic
formulation that guides or governs practice from a position outside any
particular conception of practice., 28 A theory "is something a practitioner
consults when he wishes to perform correctly, with the term 'correctly'
here understood as meaning independently of his preconceptions, biases,
or personal preferences. ,,29 If one accepts Fish's notion of textual
interpretation-if we are always and already interpreting-then his
denigration of theory necessarily follows (assuming one also accepts his
definition of theory). If a theory must give "explicit instructions that
[leave] no room for interpretive decisions,"30 or require an individual to
"[surrender] his judgment ... in order to reach conclusions that in no way
depend on his education, or point of view, or cultural situation,"'" then
theory becomes impossible. Nothing-and that includes theory-can be
outside of or prior to interpretation. And that is exactly Fish's point:
Theory must fail. Pushing his argument to an extreme conclusion, Fish
declared that theory "is entirely irrelevant to the practice it purports to
critique and reform. 32
Most important for legal scholarship, then, Fish argued that theories of
adjudication have nothing to do with the practice of adjudication.
"[J]udging or doing judging is one thing and giving accounts or theories of
judging is another.... ""3 Regardless of what theories we advocatewhether originalist or natural law or anything else-judges do the same

27. FISH, NATURALLY, supranote 3, at 360.
28. Fish, DennisMartinez, supra note 3, at 1779.

29. Id. For a similar definition of theory, see Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against
Theory, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 723, 723-24 (1982). According to Fish, the theoretical project is an

effort to govern social practices in two ways:
(1) [I]t is an attempt to guide practice from a position above or outside it[,] and (2) it is an
attempt to reform practice by neutralizing interest, by substituting for the parochial
perspective of some local or partisan point of view the perspective of a general rationality to
which the individual subordinates his contextually conditioned opinions and beliefs.
Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 437 (emphasis in original).
30.
31.
32.
33.

Fish, Consequences, supra note 3, at 434.
Id.at437.
Fish, DennisMartinez, supra note 3, at 1797.
Id. at 1779.
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thing: They judge.3 4 The ability or know-how for judging a case arises
solely from participating in the interpretive community of the law or, in
other words, from being embedded in the practice of adjudication. The
,.account one has of adjudication is logically independent of one's ability
to engage in it."3 5 Indeed, Fish added, whether one is convinced by Fish's
own theoretical account of the practices of interpretation and adjudication
is irrelevant to those practices because, after all, theory-even Fish's
theory-has no consequences for practice.3 6 The critical point of Fish's
argument was clear: All of the legal theory being published in law journals
and books was inconsequential. Legal scholars write theory to govern or
seriously influence judicial practices, but theory is irrelevant to practice.
"The point is, finally, a simple one," Fish explained, "there is no
relationship between the level on which high-theory debates usually occur
and the level on which you are asked to sort through
the complexities of a
37
real life situation and determine a course of action.
Fish subsequently extended his argument to principle. Principles, as
defined by Fish, are "abstractions like fairness, impartiality, mutual
respect, and reasonableness [that supposedly] can be defined in ways not
hostage to any partisan agenda. 3 Legal scholars articulate and invoke
principles to argue for certain conclusions or judicial decisions;
supposedly, the preferred conclusions or decisions issue neutrally from the
principles rather than from some partisan political or cultural stance .39 The
problem, according to Fish, is that principles cannot do any argumentative
work-cannot support any substantive conclusion-unless bolstered by
,some currently unexamined assumptions about the way life is or should
be, and it is those assumptions, contestable in fact but at the moment not

34. Even if ajudge claims to follow a theory, explaining that theory in her judicial opinions, Fish
argued that at most the judge is offering a post-hoc account of why the case was decided as it was. The
judge's opinion, in other words, does not explain how the judge arrived at the decision or how the
decision was generated. Id. at 1790. Fish's account of judicial decision making resembled that given
by the American legal realist, Joseph Hutcheson. Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The
Function of the "'Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929). For a discussion of

realism, see Feldman, VOYAGE, supra note 1, at 108-15.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Fish, Fiss, supra note 3, at 1347.
Id.; FISH, CLASS, supra note 3, at 370.
Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 763.
FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 2.

39. For instance, Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager maintained that the religion clauses
embody a broad principle of "equal regard," which "demands that the interests and concerns of every
member of the political community should be treated equally, that no person or group should be
treated as unworthy or otherwise subordinated to an inferior status." Christopher L. Eisgruber &
Lawrence G. Sager, Equal Regard, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 200, 203

(Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000).
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contested or even acknowledged, that will really be generating the
conclusions that are supposedly being generated by the logic of
principle., 40 In short, the "trouble with principle is ... that it does not
exist[.] ' 4' But, of course, Fish added that this conclusion has no
consequences for our actual practices. For instance, the recognition that no
principle underlies the First Amendment does not lead to any particular
normative interpretation of the First Amendment. 42 So, in the end, if we
are to make decisions and take actions-and we all apparently do so-we
cannot turn to theory or rely on principles for guidance. We can only draw
on our beliefs, politics, and know-how. "I am as usual offering no
recommendation (you can't coherently recommend an inevitability)," Fish
admitted. 43 "[I am] just pointing out ... that when all is said and done there
is nowhere to go except to the goals and desires that already possess you,
and nothing
to do but try as hard as you can to implement them in the
44
world.,

B. Schlag and Normative Legal Thought
Schlag similarly criticized legal scholarship. Most legal scholarship
produced during the past century, according to Schlag, should be
categorized as normative. When confronted with some specified legal or
social problem, legal scholars typically respond by analyzing a series of
cases, statutes, or both that seem relevant to the problem. Then the author
concludes with a normative recommendation that will supposedly resolve
the problem. For instance, the Supreme Court should adopt a new or
modified doctrinal framework, or Congress should enact or amend a
statute. To a great extent, normative law review articles read like glorified
appellate briefs. They present the issues, discuss the facts, parse the cases,
and recommend conclusions. 45 For many law professors, such a normative
recommendation is the sine qua non of "serious scholarship.46

40. FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 3.
41. Id. at2.
42. Id. at 116-17; see Stanley Fish, Mission Impossible: Settling the Just Bounds Between
Church and State, in LAW AND RELIGION: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 383 (Stephen M. Feldman ed.,
2000) (explaining how there is no principle of religious freedom).
43. FISH, PRINCIPLE, supra note 3, at 8.
44. Id. at 8-9.
45. Cf Francis J. Mootz, Desperately Seeking Science, 17 WASH. U. L.Q. 1009, 1012 (1995)
(observing that "[n]ormative legal scholarship often amounts to glorified advocacy briefs").
46. Arthur Austin, Tihe Postmodern Infiltration of Legal Scholarship, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1504,
1507 (2000) (reviewing PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW (1999), & JAMES BOYD
WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE (1999)).
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Schlag repeatedly and unmercifully condemned such normative legal
scholarship. Normative scholars believe that their scholarly
recommendations influence legal and political decision makers, including
especially judges. But normative writing, Schlag declared, does not
achieve its desired effect. For the most part, judges and other decision
makers do not care about the recommendations of legal scholars. 47 Most
law review articles are published stillborn: they are never read by their
intended audience. Schlag wrote: "Normative legal thought ' can
no longer
4
be seen to govern, regulate or even describe human activity. , 1
Although normative legal thought does not achieve its self-proclaimed
goals, it nonetheless has harmful consequences. 49 Normative legal thought
constructs and reconstructs a social reality revolving around the modernist
self-Schlag's preferred term is the "relatively autonomous self"50 This
modernist self "concedes that it is socially and rhetorically constituted yet
maintains its own autonomy to decide just how autonomous it may or may
not be."'" That is, the relatively autonomous self is a subject or self who
admits that it is socially constrained, to a degree, but who nonetheless
remains a sovereign center of power that can readily transform the
world-merely because it chooses to do so. By suggesting to both readers
and writers over and over again that they are free to choose and to
implement whatever values, whatever legal and social changes, they find
most appealing, normative legal scholarship helps induce legal scholars to
believe that they truly 5have
such enormous social powers-but, according
2
to Schlag, they do not:

47.

Schlag, Writing, supra note 2, at 421; Schlag, The Problem, supra note 2, at 1738; Schlag,

Normativity, supra note 2, at 871-72. For years, judges and other legal scholars have been noting the
growing gap between practitioners and law professors. Alex Kozinski, Who Gives a Hoot About Legal
Scholarship?, 37 HOUS. L. REv. 295 (2000); Sanford Levinson, The Audience for ConstitutionalMetaTheory (Or, Why, and To Whom, Do I Write the Things I Do?), 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 389 (1992);
Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91
MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992).
48. Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2, at 185-86.

49. "[T]he claim is not that normative legal thought is without effect, but that the politics of
normative legal thought are not what normative legal thought imagines them to be: its politics are in
the process, the practice of its construction, and the form of its dissemination." Schlag, Normativity,
supra note 2, at 909.
50. See, e.g., Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at 39 (referring to the "relatively autonomous
self').
51. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 895 n.248.
52. Id. at 841-52. Schlag wrote:
Each and every social, legal, and political event is immediately represented as an event
calling for a value-based choice. You are free to choose between this and that. But, of course,
you are not free. You are not free because you are constantly required to reenact the motions
of the prescripted, already organized configuration of the individual being as chooser. You
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[Normative legal thought] becomes the mode of discourse by which
bureaucratic institutions and practices re-present themselves as
subject to the rational ethical-moral control of autonomous
individuals (when indeed they are not), just as normative legal
thought constructs us (you and me) to think and act as if we were at
the center-in charge, so to speak-of our own normative legal
thought (when indeed we are not).53
Schlag aimed to reduce or even to eliminate the production of normative
legal scholarship. Naturally, he could not simply recommend to his readers
that they stop writing normative scholarship. Doing so would be, from
Schlag's perspective, ineffectual. Moreover, if Schlag had overtly
recommended such a change, he too would have been guilty of
reconstructing the modernist self He would have been encouraging his
readers to assume they could change the world merely by declaring their
value choices and implementing them. So instead, Schlag wrote
deconstructively: He sought to uncover and disrupt the illegitimate
assumptions that tacitly undergird normative legal scholarshipassumptions that ordinarily go unrecognized and unexamined.54 Schlag,
like other postmodern deconstructionists, brought background assumptions
to the forefront so that they could be scrutinized and critiqued. He was
most concerned, of course, with the assumption that we are modernist
selves who can readily transform the world. Hence, Schlag wanted his
deconstructive attack to induce readers to doubt their being or existence as
such selves.55 If they were to do so, Schlag believed, then they would

have to, you already are constructed and channeled as a choosing being. Not only is this
social construction of the self extraordinarily oppressive-but it often turns out to be absurd
as well. Much of its absurdity can be seen in the normative visions that routinely issue from
the legal academy urging us to adopt this utopian program or that one-as if somehow our
choices (I like decentralized socialism, you like conservative pastoral politics, she likes liberal
cultural pluralism) had any direct, self-identical effect on the construction of our social or
political scene. The critical insistence on making political value choices is utterly captive to a
conventional and nostalgic description of the political field-a description and definition of
the field that is guaranteed to yield political disablement and disempowennent. To tell people
that they are already empowered to make political value choices is, in effect, to bolster the
dominant culture's representation that we are free-choosing beings and to strengthen the
forces that lead to our own repeated, compelled affirmation of (meaningless) choices.
Schlag, The Problem, supra note 2, at 1700-01 (footnotes omitted).
53. Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2, at 185 (emphasis in original).
54. See, e.g., Schlag, Phrenology, supra note 2 (seeking to deconstruct normative legal
scholarship, particularly Langdellian scholarship, by comparing it to the now-disreputable science of
phrenology). For a critique of Schlag's Phrenology article, see Stephen M. Feldman, Playing With the
Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer's Toolbox, 85 VA. L. REv. 151, 164-76 (1999).
55. Schlag explained that most American legal thinkers have focused on "either law's relation to
its own internal requirements (formalism) or law's relation to its object (legal realism)." SCHLAG,
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likely stop writing normative legal scholarship-because they would
recognize that it is irrelevant to legal and judicial practices.
II.

FISH AND SCHLAG ATTACK EACH OTHER: THE PERSISTENT

MODERNIST SELF

Schlag's criticism of Fish was straightforward: A little Harold with a
purple crayon-a modernist self-lurks within Fish's central concept of an
interpretive community.5 6 According to Schlag, Fish left ambiguous the
meaning or content of interpretive communities. Interpretive communities,
as described by Fish, perform a function similar to that of Thomas Kuhn's
paradigms or Hans-Georg Gadamer's traditions.57 That is, interpretive
communities, like paradigms or traditions, provide us with the background
that is needed for interpretation and understanding to get off the ground.
Yet, Fish did not attempt to closely specify the precise definition of an
interpretive community. As Schlag phrased it, Fish's interpretive
communities are "theoretical unmentionables" that are left "relatively
empty and unstructured. 5 8
Schlag argued that Fish's failure to define concretely the contours of
interpretive communities was not mere happenstance. If Fish had
specifically defined interpretive communities, then the process of
interpretation might have appeared too mechanistic, and humans might
have seemed doomed to some form of determinism-where external and
objective forces predetermine or dictate human actions, perceptions, and
even thoughts. In other words, Schlag argued that Fish ambiguously
rendered the concept of an interpretive community to avoid a Fishian form
of a determined self.59 Schlag pounced, declaring that Fish's nebulous
notion of an interpretive community "leaves the self as the final
adjudicator of its own acts... ,,60 Fish, in short, had smuggled the
modernist self into his interpretive schema. For Schlag, this was a fatal
mistake. Fish's notion of the self, as construed by Schlag, always retains

LAYING, supra note 2, at 163. He instead sought to focus on a "third relation ... one between law and
the subjects who invoke its name." Id.
56. Schlag criticized Fish in Schiag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2.
57. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 282-84 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G.
Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
43-51 (2d ed. 1970).
58.

Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at42.

59. Id.at44-45.
60. Id. at 45.
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autonomy because
it does "not feel closeted by an overly determined
61
objectivity.',

Schlag argued further that Fish's imprecision leaves a lacuna within the
process of interpretation. Because interpretive communities are not closely
defined, the elements of the process of interpretation also cannot be
specifically delineated. Ultimately and inevitably, then, the modernist self
provides the necessary substance and direction:
The self knows that there is something irreducible about the act of
interpretation that simply cannot be made articulate and that in any
case could not be captured by anything so systematic, so universal,
or so univocal as a theory. The self knows that interpretation is a
social practice and that there will always be something
about
62
reason.
or
theory,
rules,
to
reduced
be
cannot
that
practice
According to Schlag, when interpretation cannot be reduced to a method
or mechanical process, when practices cannot be governed by theories,
when adjudication cannot be determined by principles, we find the
relatively autonomous self pulling the levers and hitting the buttons .63Of
course, Fish nonetheless
was booming, "Pay no attention to the self behind
64
the curtain! ,
Turning the tables, Fish similarly criticized Schlag. Schlag's goal,
recall, was to reduce or eliminate the production of normative legal
scholarship. To do so, he deconstructed such scholarship by uncovering its
ostensibly illegitimate assumption or foundation: the modernist self
According to Fish, though, Schlag mistakenly believed that his
deconstructive attack on legal scholarship could actually change the world.
As Fish read Schlag, Schlag wanted legal scholars to become more "'selfconscious or self-critical.' 65 If legal scholars were to acquire "the
requisite critical self-consciousness, 66 then they (we) presumably would
refrain from writing normative articles. After all, if legal scholars realized

61. Id. Adam Thurschwell provided an interesting alternative perspective. He argued that while
the concepts such as Gadamer's tradition or Fish's interpretive community help us to grasp or
understand the social construction of reality-our being-in-the-world-we should not attempt to reify
or reduce any actual tradition or interpretive community (or even the concepts themselves) into a
single linguistic formulation or a fixed object. Adam Thurschwell, Reading the Law, in THE RHETORIC

OF LAW 275, 312-17 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds., 1994).
62.

Schlag, Fish v. Zapp, supra note 2, at 44.

63. Id.at39-40.
64.

In the movie, The Wizard of Oz, the Wizard, when he is discovered, says, "Pay no attention

to that man behind the curtain." THE WIZARD OF Oz (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. 1939).
65. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 769 (quoting Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 852).
66. Fish, Minimalism, supra note 3, at 770.
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that they and their readers were not modernist selves, then why would they
continue writing a form of scholarship that assumed otherwise? In sum,
Schlag wanted to disturb his readers sufficiently so that they became more
self-reflexive, thereby doubting their existence as modernist selves, and
ultimately ceasing to write normative legal scholarship.
Fish argued, though, that Schlag's deconstructive writings were merely
a form of theory. Even if Schlag was more imaginative or obscure than
most theorists, his theory-writing was, in the end, no more effective than
any other theory. Fish explained,
Rhetorical/deconstructive legal thought produces nothing, for, like
normative legal thought, it is not a practice, but an account of a
practice. Just as normative legal thought cannot confer on the
practices of which it is an account, the qualities it prizes (stability,
neutrality, and so on), neither can rhetorical/deconstructive legal
thought confer on the practice of which it is an account the qualities
67
it prizes (indeterminacy, dispersal, de-centeredness, and so on).
So, according to Fish, deconstructive legal thought cannot disturb or
change the practice of legal scholarship. The form and quantity of
normative legal scholarship will go unchanged. In fact, Fish added,
normative legal thought could not possibly become more self-aware of its
own rhetoricity-which Schlag quested after-because then "it would no
longer be normative legal thought[.] , 68 Instead, "it would be some form of
thought-sociological or anthropological
in nature-that took normative
69
legal thought as its object[r.],
Fish, in effect, criticized Schlag for assuming that his readers could be
liberated once they recognized that normative legal scholarship is
grounded on unrealistic assumptions. Put in other words, Fish castigated
Schlag for assuming that his readers were modernist selves empowered to
change their world, if only they would listen to Schlag. 7 Schlag wrote as if
his readers were little Harolds, waiting with their purple crayons, anxious
to redraw the world of legal scholarship. Even though Schlag did not
overtly recommend social and legal changes, as normative legal scholars
do, Schlag nonetheless counted on a clandestine modernist self to be a

67. Id. at 771 (emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 769.
69. Id.
70. See Stephen M. Feldman, Diagnosing Power: Postmodernism in Legal Scholarship and
JudicialPractice(With an Emphasis on the Teague Rule Against New Rules in Habeas Corpus Cases),

88 Nw. U. L. REv. 1046, 1097 (1994) (criticizing Schlag for writing about trial lawyers as if they were
relatively autonomous selves).
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center of power and control. Thus, Fish concluded, however right Schlag
might be in his depiction of social reality and legal scholarship, his
argument "goes nowhere, issues in nothing, is of no consequence
whatsoever." 7 ' Schlag addressed a reader who does not exist.
Deconstructive legal thought, theory, and scholarship-like all legal
thought, theory, and scholarship-is totally distinct from the practices they
describe and seek to influence. 72
III. FEMINIST THEORY AND THE RELATIONAL (POSTMODERN) SELF
A. The Problem of the Socially ConstructedSelf
Fish and Schlag criticized each other for making the same mistake.
That mistake could be traced directly to a central and common postmodern
theme. Namely, both Fish and Schlag uncovered and elaborated the social
construction of the subject or self In contrast with modernist depictions of
the self as an independent and autonomous agent exercising sovereign
control, postmodernists emphasize that social forces and relations
constitute the self (or the experience of a self). 73 For instance, Michel
Foucault described how power permeates society and produces disciplined
and normalized selves (and bodies).74 Power constructs us as "subjects. '7 5
Jacques Derrida emphasized the connection between language and the
constitution of the self The self or subject is not "what it says it is. The
subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or identity, some pure cogito
of self-presence; it is always inscribed in language. 76
Fish and Schlag both subscribed to this view of the subject or self. Fish
emphasized that the individual self is always and already situated in an

71. Fish, MVnimalism, supra note 3, at 772.

72. "Theorists like Schlag may be right when they describe the law and everything in it as
'socially constructed,' but the rightness of the description does no work. It does not lead to an
alteration in practice." Id. at 771.
73. HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND
HERMENEUTICS 120 (2d ed. 1983); David Couzens Hoy, Introduction, in FOUCAULT: A CRITICAL

READER 1, 4-5 (David Couzens Hoy ed., 1986).
74. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE, supra note 6, at 30-31, 182-83, 193; Michel Foucault, Why Study
Power: The Question of the Subject, reprinted in HUBERT L. DREYFUS & PAUL RABINOW, MICHEL
FOUCAULT: BEYOND STRUCTURALISM AND HERMENEUTICS 208, 208, 212 (2d ed. 1983).

75. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in POWER/KNOWLEDGE 78, 97 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin
Gordon, Leo Marshall, John Mepham & Kate Soper trans., 1980); see Marcelo Hoffman, Disciplinary
Power, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 27, 33-34 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (explaining

Foucault's concept of disciplinay power).
76. Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction and the Other, in DIALOGUES WITH CONTEMPORARY
CONTINENTAL THINKERS 107, 125 (Richard Kearney ed., 1984) (emphasis in original).

20171

THE RETURN OF THE SELF

interpretive community. There is no 'escape from' or 'prior to' this
situated existence .77 Meanwhile, Schlag stressed that culture constitutes
the individual's perceptions of herself. The culture of the legal
community, including legal scholarship, constructs and reconstructs our
perceptions that we-scholars and readers-are modernist (relatively
autonomous) selves who can exercise control over the social and legal
world. 78 The problem for Fish and Schlag was that if one is underscoring
the social construction of the subject, then harboring a modernist self
within one's scholarship might be a tad embarrassing. Hence, Schlag
attacked Fish on this point, and vice versa. Although each explored the
ramifications of the social construction of the subject, they both retained
some remnant of the self in their writings.
Regardless, important lessons can be gleaned from this confrontation
between Fish and Schlag. If renowned postmodernists like Fish and Schlag
both sheltered selves in their writings, then who can avoid doing so?
Nobody, as Derrida himself suggested. Derrida steadfastly deconstructed
the modernist self (specifically, in his terms, Derrida focused on the socalled "metaphysics of presence"), 79 but he admitted that his very
arguments unavoidably reinscribe or recreate the self "There is no sense
in doing without the concepts of metaphysics [including the modernist
self] in order to shake metaphysics[J" Derrida wrote.80 "We have no
language-no syntax and no lexicon-which is foreign to this history; we
can pronounce not a single destructive proposition which has not already
had to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of
precisely what it seeks to contest.""' In other words, we are all little
Harolds dragging around our purple crayons. To be sure, I certainly have
not avoided this trap (of) myself
Three interrelated implications flow from this realization. First, when
Fish and Schlag criticized others for acting like little Harolds, they were
shooting at easy targets: Of course, legal scholars could be unmasked as
modernist selves. I do not mean to suggest that Fish's and Schlag's
critiques of legal scholarship were, at the time, obvious or not worthwhile.
For several years, Fish and Schlag were among our most imaginative and
interesting jurisprudential scholars. After all, before Fish and Schlag,

77. Fish, Change, supra note 3, at 423-24, 433.
78. Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at 841-52.
79. JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY 50 (Gayatri Chakravoriy Spivak trans., 1976).
80. Jacques Derida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE 278, 280 (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
81. Id.at280-81.
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nobody would have written in a law review: 'Of course, legal scholars
could be unmasked as modernist selves.'
Second, to a great degree, Fish and Schlag wasted their time attacking
each other, but perhaps they did not know what else to do. They had both
thoroughly denounced traditional legal scholarship, so it would have been
hypocritical for either one to write normative articles advocating for a
theory or principle. What to do next?8 2 Well, let's attack another
postmodernist. But their respective attacks accomplished little beyond
allowing each scholar to add a publication to his CV. Nobody in the legal
academy should have been less surprised than Fish and Schlag to learn
that each one harbored a Harold in his scholarship.
Third, Fish and Schlag's confrontation, arising from their invocations
of the socially constructed subject and their attacks on the modernist self,
sheds light on the current moribund state of postmodern jurisprudence. In
the American legal system, a dismissal of the self is unlikely to be wellreceived.83 Given our Constitution, with its emphasis on individual rights
such as free expression and religious freedom, scholarship denigrating the
self, autonomy, and agency will probably fall on deaf ears. To a great
degree, David Gray Carlson accurately assessed the reception to Schlag's
criticisms of legal scholarship and the modernist self "The legal academy
refuses [even] to duel with Pierre Schlag. 84 When Schlag grandiosely
declared that his scholarship threatened the academy with catastrophe,
nobody shook in their boots.85 Instead, Schlag sounded unfortunately
shrill. The legal scholars who paid the most attention to Schlag's writings
were other postmodernists, like Fish, and we know his reaction.
Perhaps, given this disconnect between postmodern and mainstream
legal scholarship, it is unsurprising that postmodernism is rarely discussed
in contemporary law reviews, especially flagship reviews.86 The 1990s

82.

Schlag would eventually arrive at one answer to this question. He would solemnly declare

that legal scholarship is "dead." Schlag, Spam, supra note 2, at 804.

83. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 42 (emphasizing the "iconic value" of autonomy in American
culture); SHERRY TURKLE, LIFE ON THE SCREEN 15 (1995) (arguing that everyday life encourages us to

view ourselves as autonomous intentional agents).
84. David Gray Carlson, Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLuM. L. REV.
1908, 1953 (1999) (reviewing PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) & PIERRE
SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL MIND

(1996)).

85. At various times, Schag pronounced that his writings were "threatening," Schlag, Missing
Pieces, supra note 2, at 1243; made the reader "feel assaulted," Schlag, Normativity, supra note 2, at
893; and engendered "intellectual and cultural catastrophe." Schlag, Nowhere, supra note 2,at 190.
86. By a flagship review, I mean a law school's general student-edited review, as opposed to
secondary journals. For example, the William & Mary Law Review is a flagship journal, while the
William & Mary Bill ofRights Journal is a secondary journal.
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were the halcyon days for publishing articles about postmodernism. For
instance, a Westlaw search for postmodernism and its derivatives and
synonyms (such as postmodem, postmodernity, postmodernist, postmodem, pomo, post-structuralism, and so on) in the 'Law Reviews &
Journals' database revealed that from 1982 to 1986, flagship journals
published only three articles referring to postmodernism in the title. From
1987 to 1991, the number jumped to eighteen. Then the number
skyrocketed: thirty-five from 1992 to 1996, and thirty-nine from 1997 to
2001.7 After 2001, the numbers declined, at first gradually, then
precipitously. From 2002 to 2006, twenty-six articles were published, but
from 2007 to 2011, the number dropped to eleven. From 2012 to the
present, flagship journals published only two such articles. Predictably,
then, recent publications have commented on the passing or death of
postmodernism. 8 One might reasonably conclude that postmodern
jurisprudence stalled during the naughts and never restarted.
B. Feminist Theory
Many modernist critics insist that the postmodern notion of the socially
constructed self inevitably leads to determinism (entailing, among other
things, a self bereft of free will). These critics argue that either the self
retains some inherent degree of independence and sovereign control or the
self disappears into a conglomeration of causal factors. A socially
constructed subject or self loses all vestige of autonomy.89 To clarify this
critique, it helps to recognize that postmodernists divide into two groups:
extreme and moderate. 90 Extreme postmodernists, on the one hand, are

87. During these times, there were nearly as many articles published in secondary journals.
Additional articles were published with the word, deconstruction, and its derivatives in the title. For
example, from 1992 to 1996, thirty-six articles were published in secondary journals, and sixteen
articles were published with the word deconstruction in the title.
88.
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TOTH,

THE

PASSING
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POSTMODERNISM:

A

SPECTROANALYSIS

OF

THE

CONTEMPORARY (2010); Adam G. Todd, Neither Dead nor Dangerous: Postmodernism and the
Teaching of Legal Writing, 58 BAYLOR L. REV. 893, 894 (2006); Timotheus Vermeulen & Robin van
den Akker, Notes on Metamodernism, 2 J. OF AESTHETICS & CULTURE
(2010)

http://www.aestheticsandculture.net/index.php/jac/article/view/5677;

see Stephen M. Feldman, An

Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54 VAND. L. REv. 2351

(2001) (defending postmodemism).
89.

See Dianna Taylor, Introduction:Power, Freedom and Subjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT:

KEY CONCEPTS 1, 2 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011) (describing this criticism of Foucault).
90.

See

STEVEN
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&

DOUGLAS

KELLNER,

POSTMODERN

THEORY

256-57

(1991)

(distinguishing extreme from reconstructive postmodemism); Stephen M. Feldman, The Problem of
Critique:TriangulatingHabermas,Derrida,and Gadamer Within Metamodernism, 4 CONTEMP. POL.
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anti-modernists: They reject modernist concepts such as truth, knowledge,
and freedom. Moderate postmodernists, on the other hand, tend to
repudiate modernist notions of these concepts, but often reformulate the
concepts in accord with postmodern themes. 9' For example, a moderate
postmodernist might invoke the notion of knowledge but refuse to
characterize it as being objective-that is, grounded on the brute data of an
external objective world.92 Nonetheless the modernist critique, that the
postmodern notion of the socially constructed self inevitably leads to
determinism, might be valid for extreme postmodernists. Such
postmodernists argue that "there is 'really' no subject, no consciousness,
no freedom, just an 'interplay of forces' and our 'selves' nothing but the
tentative juncture of these forces. 9 3
Because extreme postmodernism and the social construction of the self
appear to end in determinism, many feminists initially rejected
postmodernism. 94 Feminism aims for social transformation to relieve
women from oppression and subjugation. 95 Such political change, it would
seem, requires individual agency and autonomy, as well as the possibility
of social critique. If women lack the autonomy necessary to criticize and
change current social 96and cultural structures, then women would appear
locked into patriarchy.

91.

See Richard J. Bernstein, Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic Ethos, in THE NEW

CONSTELLATION 142, 154-55 (1991) (arguing Foucault does not herald the death of the subject, trth,
or freedom).
92. See Best & Kellner, supra note 6, at 258 (arguing for a postmodern reconstruction of
epistemological concepts); Kuhn, supra note 57, at 15, 24, 125-26, 135 (arguing paradigms shape fact
observations, and questioning the accessibility of brute data in science); Feldman, The Problem, supra
note 90, at 301-03 (arguing for truth and understanding without objectivity).
93.

ROBERT C. SOLOMON & KATHLEEN M. HIGGINS, A SHORT HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 303

(1996); see DOUGLAS KELLNER, MEDIA CULTURE 233 (2003) (summarizing the postmodern attack on
the modernist self). "Inthe extreme version of postmodernism, the determinants of class and race and
age and group and religion and sexual orientation and role and mood and context constitute us in a
changing pattern from moment to moment. From their varied intersection springs up a postmodern
self. 'I' am merely the place where these things happen." James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible' The
Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 489, 521 (1991).
94. Martha Minow, Incomplete Correspondence:An Unsent Letter to Mary Joe Frug, 105 HARV.

L. REV. 1096, 1104 (1992) (questioning the political implications of postmodernism); see Christine Di
Stefano,

Dilemmas

of

Difference:

Feminism,

Modernity,

and

Postmodernism,

in

FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 63 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990) (questioning connections between
feminism and postmodernism).
95.

See, e.g., Tracy E. Higgins, Why Feminists Can't (or Shouldn't)Be Liberals, 72 FORDHAM L.

REV. 1629, 1629 (2004) (discussing connections between liberalism and women's subordination);
Catriona Mackenzie

& Natalie

Stoljar,

Introduction: Autonomy Refigured, in

RELATIONAL

AUTONOMY 3, 3-4 (2000) (discussing the need to understand oppression and subjection); Cynthia
Willett et al., Feminist Perspectives on the Self, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(Edward N. Zalta ed., fall 2015 ed.) (emphasizing subordination of women's selfhood).
96. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FoX-GENOVESE, FEMINISM WITHOUT ILLUSIONS 153-59, 220-21
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Yet other feminists recognized close affinities between postmodernism
and feminist theory. 97 Most important, feminists discerned that the
modernist conception of the self was unrealistic, that the autonomous and
sovereign agent, independent of and unconstrained by social relationships,
disregarded women's experiences. Groundbreaking work in psychology
set the stage for this breakthrough. Nancy Chodorow argued that
individuals develop a sense of self only in relation to others. More
specifically, young girls and boys connect with and react to their primary
caregivers, usually mothers.98 Carol Gilligan extended this insight by
showing that girls develop a different voice from boys, a different sense of
morality-an ethic of care-because of their existential connection to
others. 99 Feminist political, social, and jurisprudential theorists built on
this basic insight, that the self is relational rather than atomistic, that
"human beings are created in and through relations with other human
beings." 00

(1991) (rejecting postmodemism as threat to feminism); Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social
Theory and Law, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59 (1989) (arguing that women have a self contrary to
postmodern arguments).
97. Martha Chamallas, Past as Prologue: Old and New Feminisms, 17 MICH. J. GENDER & L.
157, 169-70 (2010) (recognizing the emergence of an explicitly postmodern feminism); see, e.g.,
Nancy Fraser & Linda J. Nicholson, Social Criticism Without Philosophy: An Encounter Between

Feminism and Postmodernism, in FEMINISM/POSTMODERNISM 19 (Linda J. Nicholson ed., 1990)
(attempting to integrate feminism and postmodernism). The most renowned postmodern feminist is
Judith Butler. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990). Like other postmodernists, feminist
postmodernists do not necessarily announce that they are postmodern. Regardless, I would include,
among others, the following: Amy Allen, Julie E. Cohen, Drucilla Cornell, Tracy E. Higgins, Margaret
A. McLaren, and Dianna Taylor. AmY ALLEN, THE POLITICS OF OUR SELVES (2008); JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF

(2012); DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION

(New ed. 1999); Tracy E. Higgins, "By Reason of Their Sex": Feminist Theory, Postmodernism, and
Justice, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1536 (1995); Margaret A. McLaren, Foucault and Feminism: Power,
Resistance, Freedom, in FEMINISM AND THE FINAL FOUCAULT 214 (Dianna Taylor & Karen Vintges
eds., 2004); Dianna Taylor, Practicesof the Se/f, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS 173 (Dianna

Taylor ed., 2011).
98.

NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING

(1978); see Marilyn Friedman,

Autonomy and Social Relationships: Rethinking the Feminist Critique, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE
SELF 40, 43 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) [hereinafter Friedman, Relationships] (summarizing

Chodorow's argument).
99.

CAROL

GILLIGAN,

IN A DIFFERENT VOICE

(1982);

see NEL NODDINGS, CARING:

A

RELATIONAL APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION (2d ed. 2013) (advocating for ethic of
care from philosophical standpoint).
100. Jane Flax, Political Philosophy and the Patriarchal Unconscious: A Psychoanalytic
Perspective on Epistemology and Metaphysics, in, DISCOVERING REALITY 245, 250 (Sandra Harding
& Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983); see, e.g., Susan J. Brison, Outliving Oneself Trauma,Memory, and
PersonalIdentity, in FEMINISTS RETHINK THE SELF 12 (Diana Tietjens Meyers ed., 1997) (arguing for
a relational self); Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 40-47 (building concept of autonomy on
relational self); Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987)
(building on different voice theory), Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1988) (same). Communitarians also criticized the modernist individual or self. ALASDAIR
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An overlap with postmodernism crystallized. Postmodernists like
Foucault asserted that power constructs us as subjects or selves, while
feminists argued that we develop and are sustained through relationships.
Regardless of the precise terminology, the positions resonated: The self is
a social creature.' 0 ' The socially constructed self is a relational self, and
vice versa.10 2 While Chodorow had focused on mothering as caregiving,
other feminist theorists extended their analyses to additional social
relationships. In Jennifer Nedelsky's words, our relational selves "are
constituted, yet not determined, by the web of nested relations within
which we live. ' iO3 She elaborated,
[E]ach individual is in basic ways constituted by networks of
relationships of which they are a part-networks that range from
intimate relations with parents, friends, or lovers to relations
between student and teacher, welfare recipient and caseworker,
citizen and state, to being participants in a global economy,
migrants in a world of gross economic inequality, inhabitants of a
world shaped by global warming. 104
Other feminists, who were not only women but also racial minorities or
members of other peripheral groups, pushed this insight about the
multiplicity of nested relations while giving it a different twist. They
emphasized that our selves develop at the intersection of multiple cultural
and social forces. 1°5 Selves or "identities are formed within the context of
social relationships and shaped by a complex of intersecting social

MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF

JUSTICE (2d ed. 1998).

101. Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 42 (emphasizing social nature of self); see Amy
Allen, Foucault, Feminism, and the Self The Politics of Personal Transformation, in FEMINISM AND
THE FINAL FOUCAULT 235 (Dianna Taylor & Karen Vintges eds., 2004) [hereinafter Allen,

Transformation] (discussing the connection between Foucault and the feminist relational self);
McLaren, supra note 97, at 215-19 (linking feminism with Foucauldian postmodernism). As McLaren

points out, Foucault also viewed power as being relational. McLaren, supra note 97, at 219.
102. Nancy J. Hirschmann, Autonomy? Or Freedom' A Return to Psycholanalytic Theory, in
AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 61, 73 (Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) ("our

desires and preferences are socially constructed").
103. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 45 (emphasis added).
104. Id. at 19.
105. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality,Identity Politics, and Violence
Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); see John A. Powell, The Multiple Self
Exploring Between and Beyond Modernity and Postmodernity, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1481 (1997)

(discussing an intersectional self).
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determinants, such as race, class, gender, and ethnicity.' 1 6 Feminists thus
were acutely aware that not all relationships are equivalent. Some are more
07
empowering, some are more oppressive, and perhaps all are partly both.1
As Nancy J. Hirschmann explained, "because [social and relational]
contexts are importantly shaped by patriarchy, sexism, racism, classism,
and heterosexism, social construction is not simply innocent or
neutral[.] '"108 Furthermore, social conditions and relations can impose
constraints on individuals at the unconscious level. The constraints are, in
a sense, absorbed as part of one's personality. 10 9 Judith Butler emphasized
how power operates at a deep psychic level by shaping our fantasies and
desires." 0 For example, a woman might embody notions of femininity
even if they are debilitating.'
The ambivalence of the social construction of the self-the potential
space between the empowering and oppressive effects of social relationsled feminists to emphasize the concept of autonomy. As feminists
perceived, the modernist critique of the postmodern social construction of
the self-that it necessarily leads to determinism-arises from the
modernist world view itself Modernism revolves around subject-object
metaphysics, around the sharp separation of the free and independent self
from the objective world." 2 From this modernist perspective, if the
individual is not free in the modernist sense, then the individual is
necessarily determined. Autonomy, from the modernist perspective,
requires an independent and atomistic self But we do not have to accept
this modernist paradigm with its dichotomy of free will versus

106. Mackenzie & Stoijar, supra note 95, at 4; see Hirschmann, supra note 102, at 73
(emphasizing the intersection of "gender, sexuality, race, and class").
107. Friedman, Relationships, supra note 98, at 55-56. Butler begins The Psychic Life of Power

by pointing out that even "subjection is paradoxical." JUDITH BUTLER, THE PSYCHIC LIFE OF POWER:
THEORIES IN SUBJECTION 1 (1997).
108. Hirschmann, supra note 102, at 73.

109. Id. ("cultural norms and social practices can produce desires within women that arbitrarily
limit their abilities to engage in the world"); see CATRIONA MACKENZIE, Three Dimensions of
Autonomy: A Relational Analysis, in AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 15, 22-23 (Andrea

Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014) (arguing that certain social conditions unjustly limit selfdetermination).
110. BUTLER, supra note 107, at 9, 78; see Allen, supra note 97, at 72-95, 173-74, 183

(explaining, criticizing, and extending Butler's argument).
111.

Compare Natalie Stoljar, Autonomy and the Feminist Intuition, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY

94, 95 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000) (claiming "that preferences influenced by
oppressive norms of femininity cannot be autonomous"), with Friedman, supra note 13, at 24-25
(arguing that women living within conditions of oppression can still exercise some degree of
autonomy).
112. See RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN,
HERMENEUTICS, AND PRAXIS (1983).
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OBJECTIVISM

AND
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determinism." 3 To the contrary, the concept of the relational self
prompted numerous feminists to reconceive autonomy from a relational
perspective. Once feminists repudiated the modernist self, they did not
need to follow the modernist argument from social construction to a
logical end in determinism. Having escaped the trap of modem subjectobject metaphysics, feminists maintained that autonomy should not be
equated with self-sufficiency and independence. 114
From the feminist perspective, autonomy develops only in and through
relationships." 5 What does this mean? The creation or construction of the
relational self is an ongoing process." 6 An individual does not reach the
age of three or five or whatever and suddenly become static, frozen in
development. Instead, one's self is always and already emerging. In other
words, the relational self is an emergent self, and the process of emergence
is always relational." 7 According to Nedelsky, "Human beings are in a
constant process of becoming, in interaction with the many layers of
relationship in which they are embedded."".8 The crux of autonomy, then,
is a capacity to participate in this ongoing process of self-creation.' 9
This autonomy is itself relational. Our relationships can facilitate the
development of a capacity for self-creation and self-determination. 20 Most
obviously, the parent-child relationship can foster in the child a capacity
for autonomous reflection and action.' 21 Autonomy, then, is not only
harmonious with but also arises from "human connections, including those
manifested in love, friendship, appropriate care, and even loyalty and
devotion.' 2 2 Nedelsky extended this point to underscore that autonomy is

113. Butler argues against allowing "feminist discourse on cultural construction [to remain]
trapped within the unnecessary binarism of free will and determinism. Construction is not opposed to
agency; it is the necessary scene of agency, the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes
culturally intelligible." Butler, supra note 97, at 187; see BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 9, at 102

(rejecting opposition between "determination and self-creation").
114. Friedman, Relationships,supra note 98, at 41.

115. Some mainstream philosophers have also articulated a relational autonomy. E.g., GERALD
DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY (1988); see Friedman, supra note 13, at 87-91

(discussing mainstream philosophers).
116. BAUMAN & RAUD, supra note 9, at 132-33; Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 50; Edward
McGushin, Foucault's Theory and Practice of Subjectivity, in MICHEL FOUCAULT: KEY CONCEPTS
127, 141 (Dianna Taylor ed., 2011). The "subject is never fully constituted." Judith Butler, Contingent
Foundations,in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS 35, 47 (1995).
117. KENNETH J. GERGEN, RELATIONAL BEING xv (2009).

118.
119.
120.
121.

Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 38.
Id. at45.
Friedman, supra note 13, at 4-7, 19-21.
Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 19.

122. Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper, Introductionto AUTONOMY, OPPRESSION, AND GENDER 1, 4
(Andrea Veltman & Mark Piper eds., 2014).
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relational through-and-through. "As we act (usually partially)
autonomously, we are always in interaction with the relationships
(intimate and social-structural) that enable our autonomy. Relations are
then constitutive of autonomy rather than conditions for it.' 123 An
individual can exercise autonomy in isolation no more than 124
she can
communicate without a linguistic community of other individuals.
The social construction of the relational self is always both limiting and
enabling. 125 For example, a nurturing parental relationship is primarily
enabling, while a racist or sexist relationship is primarily limiting. The
relational self can distinguish between the limiting and enabling effects of
social forces to the degree it is autonomous. To be clear, we never
completely escape social forces, the power of relationships. 126 Yet, we can
learn to create ourselves, to resist unwanted relations, to fight
oppression-but only because of the tools we acquire and sustain in our
social context, in our relationships. 27 We can navigate power the way a
surfer rides a wave. Irresistible power can overwhelm us at any moment,
but with the proper training, we retain the possibility of affecting our
course in a meaningful fashion. 28 This metaphor breaks down, though, if
we imagine a sole surfer. We are never surfing alone because autonomy is
a relational capacity or competency, "a mode of interacting with
others.',129 As Marilyn Friedman summarized relational autonomy,
,persons are fundamentally social beings who develop the competency for
autonomy through social interaction with other persons. These
developments take place in a context of values, meanings, and modes of
self-reflection that cannot exist except as constituted by social
practices. 'i' 3 °
What about Harold and his purple crayon? We now know that Harold
had a far richer life than initial appearances suggested. For his age, Harold
is an outstanding artist, but he has been lucky. His mother and father are

123. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 46.

124. See id. at 55 (comparing autonomy to speaking a language). "[A]gency is not an attribute of a
subject or something that someone has, but is rather a relationship that is enacted in the world." Maria
Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease, Recognition, Resistance and Reconstruction, in THE POLITICS OF
RECOGNITION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 1, 5 (Maria Pallotta-Chiarolli & Bob Pease eds. 2014).
125. Cushman, supra note 10, at 350; Linda Barclay, Autonomy and the Social Self, in
RELATIONAL AUTONOMY 52, 56-57 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
126. Allen, supra note 97, at 179.
127. McLaren, supranote 97, at 215-18.

128. Taylor, supra note 89 at 4 (discussing Foucault and "the practice of navigating power").
129. Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 55.
130. Marilyn Friedman, Autonomy, Social Disruption, and Women, in RELATIONAL AUTONOMY

35, 40 (Catriona Mackenzie & Natalie Stoljar eds., 2000).
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wealthy enough to buy him a purple crayon. Moreover, his mother is a
graphic designer who draws with Harold every day. His father praises
Harold's drawings and tapes them on the refrigerator. The family lives in a
small but vibrant city in the United States. That city has an excellent preschool, which Harold attends. Harold also enjoys kicking a ball around the
backyard with his friend, Frances. Harold wants to play on a soccer team
with Frances, but Harold's parents believe that organized sports are overly
competitive. They refuse to sign him up for the neighborhood mini-soccer
league. Over time, Harold begins to think of himself as an artist. He joins
the Art Club in high school. He frequently marvels at the beauty of the
world and envisions pictures that he could paint. Later in life, Frances
plays college soccer, while Harold becomes a professional artist.
Harold, quite clearly, developed as an individual, as a self, within a
web of relationships, including his mother, his father, his friend, his
school, his city, and so on. Those relationships simultaneously enabled and
constrained Harold. He developed a capacity for artistic expression, for
autonomous self-creation, and he eventually became a successful artist,
but he never played soccer. As an artist, Harold experienced a high degree
of satisfaction. He had internalized an identity as an artist, so he was
happy to make money doing what he loved. Yet, like many people he
knew, Harold had mixed feelings about his parents. He frequently wished
they had encouraged him to play team sports.
IV. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR POSTMODERN JURISPRUDENCE

The recognition of a relational self and relational autonomy has at least
two significant implications. First, social critique is possible. If we have
the capacity to distinguish limiting from enabling social forces and
relations, then we also have the capacity to criticize our society and
culture. Although there is no escape from relationships of power, that
means only "that there is no Archimedean point, no point wholly outside
power relations from which our critique of power can be launched or our
transformative vision of a better future can be articulated."'' But if one
repudiates modernist subject-object metaphysics, then the lack of an
Archimedean point should be neither surprising nor problematic. 1 12 As
feminist philosopher Amy Allen emphasized, "we can envision subjects as

131. Allen, supra note 97, at 177; see Butler, supra note 116, at 39 (arguing that the recognition of
power is "the very precondition of a politically engaged critique").
132. See Bernstein, supra note 112, at 16-20 (explaining importance of Archimedean point to
modernist philosophy).
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both socially and culturally constructed in and through relations of power
and subjection and capable of critique and of critically directed selfconstitution and social transformation."' 3 3 According to Allen, the feminist

concept of the relational self suggests that "mutual, reciprocal,
communicative social interactions are necessary for the formation,
sustenance, and repair of the self.' 13 4 Consequently, if a set of social
relationships and interactions are not mutual and reciprocal, if one
individual or entity manipulates or deceives another for the former's
benefit, then we can reasonably denounce the relationship as unjust or
destructive to autonomy. 3 5 Unquestionably, many individuals, struggling
to develop capacities for autonomy and social critique, confront far greater
obstacles than did our friend Harold. But for Harold or anyone else, the
repudiation of modernism and the recognition of the relational
(postmodern) self can facilitate autonomy and social critique. If we do not
understand that the self is relational, if we insist that autonomy requires
independence, separation, and self-sufficiency, then critique might never
get off the ground. Isolation does not produce social change.
Second, if we have the capability for social critique, as I suggest, then
we should rethink many jurisprudential concepts, particularly in
constitutional law. 36 For example, we should stop conceiving of
constitutional rights as protecting atomistic individuals from state power.
Instead, we should envision rights as facilitating constructive and creative
relationships and protecting against destructive or distorting relationships.
This perspective might sometimes engender limits on government, but
might also encourage government restrictions on private entities, like
corporations, which can manipulate individuals and diminish their
autonomy. 137
In short, we now can see the possibility of postmodern social critique
and jurisprudence. Such a possibility does not mean that we enjoy a
sovereign power to remake the world, like a modernist Harold. Rather, we
are empowered to criticize, to act autonomously, and to work with others
to change the world. To be sure, change is not as easy as writing a law
review article. Progressive political and social change is difficult, partly

133. Allen, supra note 97, at 177.
134.
135.

Allen, Transformation,supra note 101, at 240.
Allen, supra note 97, at 177-79. Allen developed her critical theory by synthesizing

Foucault, Jirgen Habermas, Butler, and Seyla Benhabib. Id. at 1-10.
136. See Nedelsky, supra note 13, at 38 (arguing to integrate relational concepts into legal

system).
137. See id. at 98 (arguing to protect "constructive relationships"); id. at 118 (arguing against

focusing on "mythic independence" from the state).
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because many individuals do not welcome such change. But we should not
be deceived: Change is possible.

